This new year is off to a turbulent start: from the roller coaster ride of tariffs and national economy to the U.S. strikes in Venezuela on January 3 and Iran on February 28, and rapidly rising gasoline prices. Russia’s war against Ukraine grinds on. The winter there was extremely difficult, but the coming spring has seen incremental gains by the Ukrainian armed forces to regain territory.
Let’s focus on the Baltic perspective from Washington, DC, and see how the “3B’s” connect to this broader framework.
The U.S. National Defense Strategy document, published by the administration in January, outlined a strategic turn, emphasizing increased burden sharing and enhanced capabilities among European allies. This largely follows language in the National Security Strategy published last year, as well as reports from December’s NATO Foreign Ministerial meeting, where the focus was on supporting Ukraine, responding to Russian aggression, and addressing hybrid threats.
President Trump signed Executive Order 14383 on February 6, “Establishing an America First Arms Transfer Strategy,” which states that “the United States will prioritize arms sales and transfers to partners that have invested in their own self-defense and capabilities.” This language may present opportunities for the Baltic states, given their significant investments in defense. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), passed on December 18, and the final defense appropriations bill, passed on February 3, both included the Baltic Security Initiative (BSI) and the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), formerly known as the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).
Security Assistance-Baltic Security Initiative & Foreign Military Financing: The final defense appropriations bill included $200 million for the Baltic Security Initiative. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for FY25 totaled $15.75 million per Baltic country – above the typical $10 million per year – with additional funds directed to the region when BSI faced potential reductions last fall. FMF for FY26 is again set at $10 million per Baltic state. The Department of Defense policy office remains in contention with Congress regarding the future and scope of these programs.
This was evident during the March 5 exchange between Nebraska Congressman Don Bacon, co-chairman of the House Baltic Caucus, and Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, during a House Armed Services Committee hearing on “U.S. Defense Strategy and Posture.”
[transcribed for clarity]. Bacon: “This is what really steams me. The administration, writ large, from the secretary to the president on down, communicates weakness when it comes to Russia. […] I can’t figure out why the president treats Zelensky and Ukraine more harshly than he does Putin, who is the invader. He’s bombing cities every night. […] There’s a moral blindness when it comes to Russia. And you see it in the NDS.”
Regarding “cooperation with model allies,” Rep. Bacon refers to the Baltic states, which are “doing more against regional threats with critical but limited U.S. support. I can’t figure out why the Pentagon didn’t want us to do the Baltic Security Initiative, and also talk about withdrawing forces from the Baltics when they lead the way. They have the highest-level defense spending. So why not be stronger for our Baltic friends?
Colby replied with his thoughts on the administration’s policy of “flexible realism.” This is defined by World Politics Review as “a U.S. foreign policy doctrine outlined in the 2025 National Security Strategy, emphasizing a ‘non-ideological’ approach that prioritizes national interests over promoting democracy.”
Colby: “We are not trying to punish the Baltic states. The president has been clear that our wealthy allies should be prepared to step up. We’re all looking at this in a pragmatic way, with [the goal of] generally getting Europe moving in the same direction. […] The goal with Russia is to try to avoid a war. And to Mr. [Ohio Rep. Mike] Turner’s point about protecting NATO – we’ve got to do it in a militarily realistic way.”
Bacon: “We should be doing more in Eastern Europe, particularly helping out Ukraine right now with weapons and sanctions. But the president does not communicate that, and I think it’s his biggest failure right now.”
Baltic Caucuses: The continued rapid growth of the Baltic Caucuses in Congress is another sign that there is much support for the U.S.-Baltic relationship. The House Baltic Caucus (HBC) surpassed 100 members in August 2025 and is now at 126 members. The Senate Baltic Freedom Caucus has 31 members. On November 19, JBANC and the three Baltic embassies hosted a Baltic Happy Hour reception celebrating caucus growth, with a dozen Members of Congress in attendance and featuring remarks from six members of the HBC, including Baltic Caucus co-chairs Representatives Don Bacon and Salud Carbajal.
Baltic Advocacy Days: Baltic Advocacy Days will take place March 16–18. More than 70 advocates from over 20 states will travel to Washington to meet with their congressional offices. Events will include receptions at the Embassy of Lithuania and in the Russell Senate Office Building.
Ukraine Advocacy: Sanctions on Russia continue to face delays. The Graham-Blumenthal Senate bill has stalled, with Senator Shaheen withdrawing support due to concerns over the bill’s broad tariff authority, specifically, provisions allowing tariffs of over 500% on countries other than Russia. The American Coalition for Ukraine (ACU), of which JBANC is a member, has endorsed a House-led compromise bill, H.R. 6856 (the Peace Through Strength Against Russia Act), which limits the 500% tariff authority to Russia only. JBANC participated in Ukraine Days, held February 23–25 and hosted by UNIS, and will also participate in the Ukraine Action Summit, scheduled for April 19–22.
Thanks to Lee Allen, JBANC’s new Managing Director, for preparing the update.
Karl Altau, JBANC
